“Lowering the Bar” project Post-Doc Maryna Rabinovych contributes to the Report on Russia’s “passportization” in Donbas

Source: Colourbox

The Report, published in terms of the Temerty Contemporary Ukraine program at the Ukrainian Research Institute at Harvard University, presents novel data on Russia’s “passportization” and the voting by the residents of the the so-called “Donetsk People’s Republic” and “Luhansk People’s Republic.” These data provides a nuanced insight into the political preferences of the self-proclaimed “People’s Republics’ ” residents and the role the engagement of the Donbas residents into voting has played for the Duma elections. Moreover, amidst Russia’s current military build-up close to Ukrainian borders, the Report illustrates how “passportization” paves the way for the combination of the conventional and hybrid aggression vis-à-vis Ukraine. It offers several policy recommendations for the Ukrainian government and the international community to address “passportization” as a form of hybrid aggression.

For the detailed summary of the Report, please visit the webpage of the Ukrainian Research Institute at Harvard University.

“Lowering the Bar” project’s Post-Doc Maryna Rabinovych Presents her Paper on Compliance at the PLURICOURTS Research Conference on Compliance Mechanisms

Source: Colourbox

her paper titled Compliance Mechanisms in the EU “Development and “Integration without Membership” Association Agreements: A Quest for Commitment and Ownership at the PLURICOURTS Research Conference on Compliance Mechanisms at the University of Oslo’s Centre for the Study of the Legitimate Roles of the Judiciary in the Global Order. The key objective behind her paper is to explore why the EU may prefer to use informal mechanisms, rather than formal ones when addressing the instances of partners’ non-compliance with their obligations under Association Agreements with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia (integration without membership context), and Latin America and the Caribbean (development cooperation context). It is shown that in both contexts, the EU’s preference forto informal mechanisms is primarily driven by its aspiration to promote partner countries’ commitment to and ownership of AAs through cooperation and assistance, rather than make them comply through formal mechanisms, such as dispute resolution or various forms of sanctions. It is, however, emphasized that if the non-compliance matter severely violates the EU’s or Member States’ interests, the EU may prefer to use a formal compliance mechanism. To ask for a draft paper, please contact Dr. Maryna Rabinovych, maryna.rabinovych@uia.no.  

More information about the conference can be found under this link.