

EU-Response to Russia's War Against Ukraine: A Research Agenda

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Why is Russia's war against Ukraine **SO** important? (1)

For Ukraine

- Existential war, culminating the 400-year history of Russia-Ukraine standoff
- War of the past against the future
- Chance to counter the 'security vacuum' Ukraine is in and restore the country's territorial integrity
- Chance for Russia's long-term weakening /regime change

For Russian regime

- Ambition to change the post-Cold War world order through achieving hegemony in the post-Soviet space
- Becoming 'great again'
- Achieving internal domination through selling "victory" to citizens

For Russia and Russian people

- Chance for regime change and transformation through military loss and collective blame




1.(up/left). Mariupol before and after Russian 'liberators'. 2. (down/left) – monument with Soviet flag in Mariupol; 3. Lenin statue in occupied Novaya Kakhovka



Why is Russia's war against Ukraine **SO** important? (2)

- **For the West (and the EU specifically)**

- Calling for new transatlantic unity (Anti-Putin coalition)
- Breaking stereotype that full-scale European war is no longer possible
- Profoundly challenging the global non-proliferation regime
- Revealing the need to take protection of values (and autocrats who challenge them) seriously
- Showing how dangerous resource dependence on autocrats is
- Challenge of autocrats' creating their own unions (BRICS)
- Demonstrating the power of propaganda and post-truth
- Showcasing that post-modern agenda does not work for all and the geopoliticization of international cooperation (ENP/EaP)
- Challenge of holding a state responsible for war and prosecuting war criminals



EU Response to War (1)

- **Political reactions**, incl. calls from HR/VP to Member States to boost arm supplies to Ukraine, cancellation of visa facilitation benefits for Russian diplomats and officials and self-critique as to the dependency on Russian fossil fuels.
- **Six packages of sanctions**, incl. ambitious sanctions against individuals, sanctions against Russian Central Bank, oil embargo, sanctions against media channels and ban for Russia-owned aircrafts to enter EU airspace.
- **Changes to internal policies**, incl. Strategic Defense Compass, RePowerEU and common gas procurements



EU Response to War (2)



Unprecedented support to Ukraine

- ✓ Political talks over granting Ukraine a membership perspective
- ✓ Ukraine's joining E-ENTSO network a year earlier than planned
- ✓ One-year suspension of all import duties for Ukraine's products
- ✓ Deployment of the EU Peace Facility (1.5 bln EUR, first ever deployment to fund weapons for a third state)
- ✓ Emergency macro-financial assistance package worth 1.2 bln EUR
- ✓ Humanitarian assistance and relief supplies worth 93 million EUR
- ✓ Setting up the Ukraine Solidarity Trust Fund
- ✓ Temporary collective protection scheme for Ukrainian refugees (3.5 bln EUR pre-financing to Member States hosting Ukrainians (first ever activation of Temporary Protection Directive)
- ✓ Visits of high-level EU officials, especially following the Bucha massacre in March 2022



EU Response to War: What Shall We Study? (1)

- ✓ The dynamics and challenges of Member States' foreign policy cooperation
- ✓ Continuity and change of specific Member States' policies vis-a-vis Russia and Ukraine during the crisis (e.g. Germany, Austria)
- ✓ EU's Russia policy since the Euromaidan, i.e. EU's insufficient involvement in oil and gas supplies' issues / EU and the Nord Stream 2 project.
- ✓ EU's and Member States' changing discourses as to energy dependency on Russia following the outbreak of the war ('blame games and claiming credit')
- ✓ EU security actorness, transatlantic relations and the future of the 'strategic autonomy' concept
- ✓ EU-UK relations in the context of the war



EU Response to War: What Shall We Study? (2)

EU – Ukraine association negotiations (compliance negotiations) turning into enlargement negotiations

EU membership perspective negotiations with Moldova and Georgia

Intra-EU debate about Ukraine's 'fast-track' membership procedure


Organizational theory perspectives on the EU response to war

Future of the European Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership

War's implications for European integration

Analyzing EU response through the “failing forward” framework

- ✓ Framework developed as a response to the demand for developing and applying new synergetic frameworks to the research at the crossroads of EU foreign policy, differentiated integration and disintegration.
- ✓ The framework shows how **deeper integration** results from a sequence of **incomplete lowest common denominator bargaining outcomes, functional spillovers** and **crises they spark** and, once again, **incomplete outcomes of intergovernmental bargaining**.
- ✓ Two instances to consider: 2014 Ukraine crisis and 2022 war



Initial policy incompleteness

- **Incomplete nature of the ENP at its birth**

- Policy's "development in a context where membership seemed less and less available for countries of the periphery" (Cadier, 2013)
- Absence of a membership perspective, despite an initially ambitious integration agenda
- On the other hand: policy's 'technocratization' and 'blindness' to its geopolitical implications
- Though seeming to be mutually contradicting, both these aspects of policy incompleteness can be seen as resulting from the 'lowest common denominator' nature of the policy
 - Leader's concerns about policy incompleteness
 - "Steady disillusionment" about stakeholder groups in partner countries



NF solutions as “polyurethane foam” for incomplete intergovernmental arrangements

- ✓ 2004-2007 action plans for Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia (“gradual approximation of norms & standards to the EU ones”)
- ✓ Eastern Partnership as a framework for the emergence of functional spillovers and the formation of supranational interest groups (among parliaments, civil society, business, youth)
- ✓ The “depth” of the trade-related parts of the AAs
- ✓ Dynamic nature of the Single Market (e.g. “Digital Single Market”)
- ✓ Multi-component institutional architecture under the AAs + the emergence of the “secondary association law”
- ✓ Neighbours’ participation in the EU sectoral bodies and agencies (e.g. the European Food Safety Authority) + EU programmes (COSME, Horizon 2020)
- ✓ Democracy promotion through functional cooperation (Freyburg, et al. 2011)
- ✓ Unilateral financial and technical assistance



2014 Ukraine crisis



Challenge to apply the framework, as the crisis was largely sparked by 3rd party (Russia)

Evident linkage between the crisis and Ukraine's European integration aspirations and ENP (Euromaidan)
Accusations of the West of having triggered the crisis

EU Crisis Response (new incomplete solution, roots for new crisis)

The crisis was addressed not through intergovernmental bargaining but **a new wave of NF solutions**

Key points:

- The EU lowered its transformative ambitions vis-à-vis the Eastern Neighbourhood, drifting towards the policy's geopoliticization and securitization
- the EU's response to the Ukraine crisis has encompassed three key aspects: sanctions against Russia; introducing the new principles in the relations with Russia and the intensification of cooperation with Ukraine.
- No new intergovernmental outcomes, except sanctions against Russia.
- Nonetheless, the EU crisis response was beneficial for Ukraine's European integration and the advancement of resilience (Support Group for Ukraine at the Commission; sectoral reforms' support; "reform positions" at the government)

EU NEIGHBOURS
south
east



2022 War

Once again, crisis
sparked by the 3rd
party

Linkage to Ukraine's
European aspirations
Multi-aspect impact
on the EU

Quo Vadis?

- ✓ As we see from the substance of the EU response to crisis, **the EU already “failed forward”** in the war context, *inter alia*, via intergovernmental solutions (on new sanctions, joint gas buying)
- ✓ But how far will it “fail forward” or fail when it comes to enlargement and recalibrating its policy vis-à-vis Eastern Neighbours?
- ✓ What else can be researched and how to improve the scholarly take on the EU response to Russia’s war against Ukraine?

